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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Austin Matthew Clyde appeals from his sentencing for burglary and 
possession of methamphetamine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Clyde with two counts of burglary and two counts of 
petit theft in one case (R., pp. 24-26) and possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of marijuana in another (R., pp. 113-15).  He pled guilty to one count 
of burglary and one count of possession of methamphetamine, and the state 
dismissed the other counts.  (R., pp. 38-40, 42-44, 62-64, 139-41, 143-45, 166-
68.)   
The case proceeded to sentencing, where the district court inquired about 
Clyde’s claim in the PSI that he had been previously convicted of three counts of 
aggravated murder.  (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 3-20; p. 23, L. 6 – p. 24, L. 14.)  The PSI 
reported: 
During the presentence interview, the defendant reported he was 
convicted of three counts of Aggravated Murder at the age of 14.  
He said he shot and killed three rival gang members and stabbed 
one of the victims 16 times.  No information pertaining to this crime 
could be located in NCIC records or information provided by the 
Utah Division of Juvenile Justice Services. 
 
(PSI, p. 6.)  In the attached GAIN-I report Clyde is quoted as saying, “I have been 
convicted of Aggravated Homicides, I killed three people and I was told I stabbed 
the third guy 17 times with a knife, when I was 14 years old and have been in 
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Juvenile Prison until I got out on 04/22/2014.”  (PSI, p. 91.)  He is also quoted as 
saying,  
I was taking [sic] out of their [his parents’] care when I killed those 
guys and they put me in the Salt Lake Jail.  I was a member of the 
RPN (Rose Park Norteno) in Utah. I shot and killed three rival 
members, I really don’t recall stabbing the guy that many times.  
They say I stabbed the guy 17 times, I know I shot the other two 
guys. 
 
(PSI, p. 101.1) 
Clyde asserted, through counsel, that he said those things “to make 
himself look tougher and bigger” and that an attempt to verify whether he had 
been involved in a triple homicide failed to produce any indication that he had, 
and what he had said about committing three murders “was taken out of context.”  
(Tr., p. 22, L. 21 – p. 23, L. 5; p. 24, L. 15 – p. 25, L. 5.)  The district court 
inquired, “[I]f there were not three killed, … why would somebody be bragging 
about it in the PSI interview?”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 6-16.)  Clyde’s counsel responded 
that Clyde is “still trying to grow up,” and that he “was just talking tough.”  (Tr., p. 
25, L. 17 – p. 26, L. 9.)  
The district court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years fixed for 
burglary and seven years with four years fixed for possession of 
methamphetamine, and retained jurisdiction for one year.  (R., pp. 70-77, 79, 
174-80, 182.)  The district court stated that “if it were clear to me that these 
                                            
1 On appeal Clyde reasserts his trial counsel’s claim “that the PSI evaluation and 
G-RRS assessment were done at the same time by the same person.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (citing Tr., p. 29, Ls. 20-21).)  The record, however, shows 
that the GAIN-I assessment was performed by Gerlyn Walker on 8/5/15 (PSI, p. 
91) while the PSI was prepared by Jaime Staples (R., p. 19).  
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murders happened you’d be going to prison with no rider ….”  (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 10-
11.)  However, the district court imposed “a substantial underlying sentence” that 
was “pretty much what I’d sentence you to if I assumed those happened,” with 
the idea that if further information came out during the course of the one-year 
retained jurisdiction period the sentences could be reduced.  (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 7-22; 
see also p. 38, Ls. 5-7.)     
Clyde appealed from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 84-86, 190-92.)  The 
two cases were consolidated for appeal.  (R., p. 198.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Clyde states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it relied at sentencing upon 
unreliable and unsupported statements contained in the PSI 
and the G-RRS? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Clyde an aggregate unified sentence of seventeen 
years, with fourteen years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Clyde failed to show the district court committed fundamental error by 
not unilaterally striking evidence of Clyde’s statements claiming to have 
killed three men? 
 
2. Has Clyde failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Clyde Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By 
Not Unilaterally Striking Evidence Of Clyde’s Statements Claiming To Have Killed 
Three Men 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 At sentencing the district court asked the parties if there were any 
additions or corrections to the PSI.  (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 4-7.)  Clyde articulated 
several, which did not include any mention of his claims he had murdered three 
men.  (Tr., p. 17, L. 8 – p. 19, L. 15.)  During the sentencing argument by Clyde’s 
counsel, the district court inquired about the claims.  (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 3-20; p. 23, L. 
6 – p. 24, L. 14.)  Clyde’s counsel did not deny that Clyde had in fact made the 
statements, but claimed that the statements were not confirmed, and were only a 
form of puffery.  (Tr., p. 22, L. 21 – p. 23, L. 5; p. 24, L. 15 – p. 25, L. 5.)  He did 
not ask the district court to strike the evidence he had made the statements.  (Id.) 
 On appeal Clyde argues that the district court erred by “rely[ing] on the 
unreliable and unsupported statements contained in the PSI and G-RRS in 
fashioning Mr. Clyde’s sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  Because he did not 
move to strike the evidence below, he has the appellate burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error.  He has failed to show error, however, much less fundamental 
error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.” 
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State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).  Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).  To show fundamental error the appellant must show that 
some action or inaction “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Id. at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. 
 
C. Clyde Has Shown No Error, Much Less Fundamental Error 
 
 “A district court’s denial of a motion to strike or delete portions of a PSI is 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Mole, 148 Idaho 950, 
961, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(1); 
State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 263, 971 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 1998)).  
Idaho Criminal Rule 32 provides: 
The presentence report may include information of a hearsay 
nature where the presentence investigator believes that the 
information is reliable, and the court may consider such information.  
In the trial judge’s discretion, the judge may consider material 
contained in the presentence report which would have been 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence applicable at trial.  
However, while not all information in a presentence report need be 
in the form of sworn testimony and be admissible in trial, conjecture 
and speculation should not be included in the presentence report.  
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(1).   
Under these rules, a sentencing court is free to consider the 
results of a presentence investigation if the reliability of the 
information contained in the report is insured by the defendant’s 
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opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine all the 
materials contained in the report, and to explain or rebut adverse 
evidence.  The court may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of 
previously dismissed charges against the defendant, or evidence of 
charges which have not yet been proved, so long as the defendant 
has the opportunity to object to, or to rebut, the evidence of his 
alleged misconduct.  It is error, however, for the court to consider 
such information if there is no reasonable basis to deem it reliable, 
as where the information is simply conjecture or speculation.  On 
appeal, we presume that a sentencing court is able to ascertain the 
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process, to 
disregard the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to properly 
weigh the remaining evidence which may be in conflict.  
 
State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926, 854 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The record shows that Clyde told both the presentence investigator and 
the GAIN-I evaluator that he had committed a triple homicide.  (PSI, pp. 6, 91.)  
Clyde never denied having made those statements, much less presented some 
sort of plausible reason the statements were misreported; he did, however, 
assert through counsel that his claims that he killed three men in a gang-related 
shooting and stabbing were not true but were instead an attempt to appear 
important.  (Tr., p. 22, L. 21 – p. 23, L. 5; p. 24, L. 15 – p. 25, L. 5; p. 25, L. 17 – 
p. 26, L. 9.)  Applying the law to these facts, the district court was well within its 
discretion to consider Clyde’s statements, made in the context of presentence 
evaluations, claiming to have killed three rival gang members.  
Clyde has failed to present any legal basis for his argument that the court 
should not have considered evidence of his repeated statements claiming he had 
killed three gang rivals, much less a basis for declaring fundamental error.  His 
confessions are not even hearsay.  I.R.E. 801(d)(2).  He affirmatively relied on 
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his own statements, such as statements about his childhood, when those 
statements were mitigating.  Importantly, he had the opportunity to address the 
evidence at the sentencing hearing.  What weight the district court gave the 
evidence was entirely within its discretion.  That Clyde wishes the district court 
had accepted his argument that his claims were mere puffery and thus granted 
them little weight is not a viable claim of fundamental error. 
  
II. 
Clyde Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years fixed for 
burglary and seven years with four years fixed for possession of 
methamphetamine, and retained jurisdiction for one year.  (R., pp. 70-77, 79, 
174-80, 182.)  On appeal Clyde claims that the district court abused its 
discretion.  Review of the record shows no such abuse. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  Id. 
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C. The District Court Considered The Relevant Legal Factors And Properly 
Exercised Its Discretion 
 
 The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.  They are “(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution.”  State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  “A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be 
sufficient.”  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) 
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  “[G]eneral deterrence is a sufficient basis for the imposition of a period of 
incarceration.”  State v. Robison, 119 Idaho 890, 893, 811 P.2d 500, 503 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citations omitted).  Sentence may also be imposed based upon the 
objective of punishment or retribution.  See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P.3d 
at 974; see also State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(affirming ten-year sentence with eight years fixed on felony injury to child charge 
involving death of a child and noting “[t]he offense to which [defendant] pleaded 
is very grave”); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (“To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the 
judicially determined ‘price’ of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence 
are particularly important.”). 
 The evidence shows that Clyde was making fraudulent returns to Wal-
Mart.  (PSI, p. 3.)  He has an extensive criminal and juvenile record for theft-
related offenses.  (PSI, pp. 4-6.)  Although Clyde was given the opportunity to 
participate in drug court in relation to his methamphetamine conviction, it is an 
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understatement to say he did poorly.  (PSI, p. 7.)  Testing indicated he was a 
high or very high risk to reoffend.  (PSI, pp. 15-17.) 
 In imposing sentence the district court found that the PSI and even 
Clyde’s allocution were “just full of thinking errors” that would not be fixed by 
probation, but had some chance of correction in “a more structured program.”  
(Tr., p. 22, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 8.)  The district court also found there were 
“significant mitigating factors,” including Clyde’s childhood and youth.  (Tr., p. 34, 
Ls. 9-13.)  However, there were also “many issues” related to personality and 
conduct disorders.  (Tr., p. 34, L. 13 – p. 35, L. 3.)  The district court considered 
Clyde’s failure to rehabilitate in the juvenile system in Utah, where he had “many 
chances” but “failed very quickly.”  (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 7-10.)  The district court 
specifically stated that it would be willing to consider probation and even a 
reduction in sentence if additional information were produced in the course of the 
year-long rider.  (Tr., p. 35, L. 11 – p. 36, L. 24.)  Based on the applicable 
sentencing factors, however, the court concluded that protection of society and 
other sentencing factors demanded a lengthy sentence. (Tr., p. 36, L. 25 – p. 38, 
L. 7.)  All of these findings are supported by the evidence and were properly 
considered by the district court in exercising its discretion. 
 Clyde’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court should not 
have found any credibility in his claim to have killed three rival gang members.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  He also believes the district court should have reached 
different conclusions regarding his risk to society and his character.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 8-10.)  However, the weight to give the evidence was within the district 
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court’s discretion, and the court specifically expressed a willingness to reconsider 
that evidence during the course of the retained jurisdiction.  Clyde has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 10th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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